Values-based leader behavior is commonly referenced by scholars and practitioners as an effective style of leadership. Problematically, multiple definitions of the concept exist that are either ambiguous, tautological, or valanced. Additionally, the concept has been researched almost entirely via questionnaires with little triangulated evidence. The current study reviews previous conceptualizations of values-based leader behavior as well as the key components of leadership, values, and behavior to arrive at a new conceptualization framed from a signaling theory perspective: goal-oriented action or inaction signaling an individual’s, organization’s, or society’s value structure. Then, I review three commonly referenced manifestations of values-based leader behaviors (charismatic leader tactics, ethical leader signals, and transformational leader behaviors) and make the case that pay-for-performance strategies too are strategies that can signal one’s value structure. Using a pre-registered experimental design, I explore the extent to which each of these values-based leader behaviors influence stakeholder in- and extra-role behavior compared to a control condition in a realistic text labeling task. Results found that the pay-for-performance strategies were strong predictors of both in- and extra-role behavior, charismatic leader tactics were strong predictors of extra-role behavior, and the control condition produced the least net output for in- and extra-role behavior combined. I conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications as well as future research directions.